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I 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DARNELL L. CARCIA, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF-RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12994 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal brought by the State of Utah 
from an order arresting judgment in a criminal prose-
cution and discharging the defendant-respondent. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN UJWER COURT 
The Respondent, Darnell L. Garcia, was tried for 
burglary in the second degree on May 18, 1972, by the 
Honorable Calvin Gould in the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, Weber County, Utah. Judg-
ment was arrested against the Respondent before final 
judgment was pronounced, and the Respondent was dis-
charged because of a denial of equal protection of 
the laws as guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order dismissing this appeal 
as being moot; or alternatively, an advisory opin-
ion affirming the lower Court's order arresting 
judgment and discharging Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Some of the facts as presented by Appellant 
ar' totally incorrect and grossly misleading. 
3 
Respondent strongly objects to Appellant's 
assertion that judgment was entered against the 
Respondent in this matter (App. Br. at 2, 1)). No 
final judgment was ever entered; judgment was arrestee 
and Respondent was discharged (R. 95). 
Respondent also strongly objects to Appellant's 
statement that different evidence concerning each 
of the defendants was introduced at the prelillinary 
hearing (App. Br. at 3). No preliminary hearing 
was ever held. At the time set for such hearing 
the charge against the co-defendant, Houle, was re-
duced (R. 6), and Respondent waived the preliainary 
examination (R. 6). In fact, it wou:H appear that 
any evidence which might have been introduced at the 
preliminary hearing would be the same for both de-
fendants r the witnesses were all subpoened to 
testify against both Houle and Respondent, and both 
hearings were set for the same time and the saae 
place. 
4 
Respondent also strongly objects to Appellant's 
assertion that there was a strong difference in 
previous criminal records (App. Br. at J). No evi-
dence whatsoever was introduced as to the record of 
the co-defendant, Houle, and only one previous mis-
demeanor plea appears in the record with respect to 
Respondent (R. 94). Respondent also strongly objects 
to Appellant's assertion that Respondent had pre-
viously been convicted of a felony. Even though 
the record at first seemed so to indicate, upon further 
inquiry it was found that Respondent had pleaded 
guilty to a misdemeanor and had served a proba-
tionary period without incident (R. 94). 
In the lower Court, two defendants were charged 
with the same offense--burglary. One was Randall 
Robert Houle, and the other Darnell L. Garcia, the 
Respondent herein. Houle was held on $2,500.00 bail 
and Respondent on $1,000.00 bail (R. 5). They were 
jointly involved in a single, identical public offense. 
After all of the evidence was received and the 
lower Court had entered a finding of guilt, defense 
5 
counsel moved for a reduction of charges alleging 
a denial of equal protection of the laws because 
Respondent's co-defendant was allowed to plead to 
a misdemeanor and Respondent was compelled to stand 
trial for a felony (R.86). The co-defendant had 
been sentenced to serve ten days in the Weber County 
jail and was given credit for ten days already 
served (R.6). 
The Court requested the prosecution to eny 
lighten it as to the justifications for treating 
the two defendants unequally in violation of the 
Alllerican Bar Association standards (R.88). A day 
and time were stipulated for taking evidence on the 
State's justifications, but at the hearing, the 
prosecution produced nothing (R.89-90). The Lower 
Court arrested judgment against the Respondent pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann. ?7-35-10, and discharged 
Respondent (Ro95). 
Respondent Garcia is twenty years of age 
(R.78). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS MISCONVEIVED1 
THERE IS NO JUIX;MENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH 
CAN BE REINSTATED, AND REVERSAL WOULD BE FUTILE. 
Appellant seeks an order from this Court 
"reinstating the Lower Court's judgment on May 18, 
1972" (App. Br. at J). This request is repeated at 
page 13 of Appellant's brief. Such a request for 
relief indicates how inaccurate ct!td misleading the 
brief of Appellant is. At no time did the Lower 
Court enter any•judgment which could be reinstated. 
At the hearing on the motion to reduce charges 
or arrest judgment, the Lower Court statedt 
"Well, I still have before me the question 
of whether or not jucigment should be im-
posed ••• So it appears to me that my 
responsibility is to either impose judg-
ment or discharge him • • • And I there-
fore arrest juds;ment pursuant to 77-35-10 
and order the Defendant discharged be-
cause of the violation of the u. s. 
Constitution." (R. 94-95) (Emphasis added) 
On May 18, 1972, a finding of guilt was made, 
but judgment was reserved for a later date, and was 
7 
never entered. Therefore, there is no judgment 
which can possibly be reinstated by this Court. 
In State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d. 117, 262 P.2d 
753 (1953), a convicted felon had been placed on 
probation. After he violated his probation, the 
State sought to have a sentence imposed. The 
defendant appealed alleging that sentencing or 
final judgment must be ma.de within a reasonable 
period of time, and that that period of time had 
expired. This Court made very clear the fact that 
a finding of guilt in a criminal action is not a 
final judgment, but a judgment is sentencing or 
others 
"action of a Court of criminal jurisdiction 
formally declaring to the accused the 
legal consequences of the guilt which he 
has confessed or of which he has been 
convicted." Id. at 120. (Emphasis 
added) -
In the present case, no action was ever taken de-
claring to the accused the legal consequences of 
8 
his guilt. No appealable, reinstatable judgment 
was ever pronounced by the lower Court. 
That there was no reinstatable judgment of the 
lower Court is also made explicitly clear by the 
definition of the term "arrest of judgment" found 
in Section 77-)4-1 of Utah Code Annotated1 
"A motion in arrest of judgment is an 
application • • • that no judgment be 
rendered • • • " (Emphasis added) 
Not only is there no judgment which can be 
reinstated, but the case itself could not be rein-
stated, nor the lower Court properly ordered to 
impose judgment, even if the Appellant had requested 
such relief. 
In State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 15? P.2d 
258 (1945), the defendant had been prosecuted on a 
charge of involuntary manslaughter. When the State 
rested, defendant's motion for dismissal was granted 
and the defendant discharged. The State appealed. 
This Court clearly and correctly stated that the 
case could not be reinstateda 
9 
"This being an appeal by the State 1n a 
criminal case, the case is reversed but 
the trial Court is directed to proceed 
no further.w Id. at ?J. (Emphasis added) 
In that same case, Chief Justice Larson, in 
his dissenting opinion, spelled out the rule on the 
point in question with more particularity, as 
follows& 
"AplX'als by the State in criminal cases 
lie only on questions of law, since de-
fendant cannot be again brought to trial. 
An appeal therefore that does not settle 
a ~oint of law which will be helpful in 
future cases is wholly abortive, a waste 
of time, effort and exoense , , , Since 
the effect of the judgment, and the posi-
tion and rights of the parties are the · 
same, regardless of reversal, and no law 
question is settled for future cases, 
the whole thing is in the nature of a 
sideshow--a moot entertainment without 
effecto 11 M• at 92-9. (Emphasis added) 
In State v, Gustaldi, 41 Utah 63, 123 Pac. 
89? (1912), a defendant was charged with murder in 
the first degree. After the State's first witness 
was called and the first question asked, the de-
f endant objected to any evidence on the ground 
that there had been no preliminary exanination as 
10 
required by law. The Court sustained the objection 
and on its own motion, discharged the defendant 
from custody. The State appealed, and this Court 
held in part 1 
"We are asked by the district attorney to 
make an order requiring the District 
Court to reinstate this case, and to pro-
ceed to try the defendant upon the inf or-
mation filed against him. We cannot do 
~ upon this record. Moreover, in this 
proceeding we are not authorized to pass 
upon the legal effect of the order and 
judgment of the District Court by which 
the action was dismissed and the jury and 
defendant discharged... Id. at 72. 
(Emphasis added) -
Even in cases in which the lower Court is 
found to have erred--something which the lower Court 
in this case clearly did not do--this Court has 
stated it cannot reinstate the matter. In State v. 
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941), one 
Dewey Johnson was convicted of injuring a cow. Froa 
an order granting defendant's motion 1n arrest of 
judgment and discharging defendant, the State of 
Utah appealed. Even though the defendant had been 
convicted and error had occurred, the Supreme Court 
could not reinstatea 
11 
"The Court was in error in arresting judg-
ment and discharging the defendanto Since 
the defendant has been discharged by the 
Court he cannot again be tried for this 
offense and all this Court can do in such 
case is settle the law involved." Id. at 
JJ5 (Eaphasis added) -
The statutes concerning arrest of jUdgment 
irrefutably indicate its effect as a bars 
"The effect of allowing a motion in 
arrest of judgment shall be to place 
the defendant in the same situation in 
which he was before the information 
was filed or the indictment found." 
Utah Code Ann. 77-34-3 
H• •• and the arrest of jud.gment shall 
operate as an acquittal of the charge 
unon which the information or indict-
ment is founded." Utah Code Ann. 
77-34-4. (Emphasis added) 
The principles which are clearly stated in 
,. 
State v. Thatcher, supra, State v. Gustaldi, supra, 
and State v. Johnson, supra, and in the statutes 
on arrest of judgment are certainly correct. Vhere 
jeopardy has attached in a case and the defendant 
ls subsequently discharged before judgment has 
entered, such discharge is a complete bar to further 
proceedings in that matter. 
12 
Jeopardy attache as soon as the State's first 
witness is sworn and testifies against the de-
fendant. In State v. Gustaldi, supra, the first 
witness had answered the first question put bJ the 
State, and the Supreme Court held that the case 
could not be reinstated. In State v. Johnson, 
supra, the defendant had been convicted as in the 
present case, but judgment arrested before final 
judgment had entered. The Supreme Court could not 
reinstate the case. 
A more recent case in Colorado takes the saae 
position as this Court. In Markiewicz, et. al., 
v, Black, eto al., 334 P.2d 539 (Colo. 19.58), de-
fendanis had entered a plea of guilty. A time was 
set at which evidence was received for purposes ot 
sentencing. Upon hearing the evidence, defendants 
were discharged because the evidence did not sus-
tain the plea. Later, attempts were made to charge 
the defendants with the identical offense and tbe 
defendants sought a writ of prohibition against 
further proceedings. The Court helda· 
13 
"A plea of guilty to an 1nd1ctaent, 1n 
good faith, with its entry on the record, 
is jeopardy, although judgment was sus-
pended or the prosecution was dismissed 
without the consent of the accused •• •" 
Id. at 541 (Emphasis added) 
The Court further stated1 
"At this hearing the Respondent heard the 
evidence presented, found that the evi-
dence did not sustain the pleaa, and 
ordered the case dismissed and the-j?eti-
tioners discharged. We need not pass on 
the pronriety of this order--right or 
wro -petitioners were in ·eo ard •" 
Id. 5 1-.542. Emphasis added 
In the present case there was not just a plea 
of guilt which placed Respondent in jeopardy, but 
a finding of guilt after evidence had been taken. 
Certainly jeopardy attached, and any order of this 
Court attempting to reinstate the case--even it 
Appellant had sought to have the case reinstated--
would only result in a plea of former jeopardy. 
Thus, action by this Court would be futile. 
The only final, appeala.ble order in this case 
1s the action of the lower Court arresting judgment 
14 
and discharging the defendant. However, an1 
question as to this order is moot, because the 
defendant cannot again be placed in jeopardy after 
his acquittal. Only an advisory opinion could be 
written by this Honorable Court to clarify the 
law. See State v. Thatcher, supra. 
The following points of argument are included 
in Respondent's brief so that if this Court feels 
disposed to rule on the correctness of the lower 
Court's order to arrest judgment, and to write an 
advisory opinicm settling the law in question, this 
Court will affirm the lower Court and clarify to 
all prosecutors the need for equal treatment ot all 
peoples before the law. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT AND HIS CO-DEFENDANT WERE IDENTI• 
CALLY SITUATED WITH RESPECT TO THE CRIME 
CHARGED AND NO JUSTIFTING REASON APPEARED 
FOR DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT. 
The Respondent and his co-defendant were not 
lerely similarly, but identically, situated with 
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respect to the alleged crime. Appellant argues that 
one of the reasons why the charge was reduced as to 
one co-defendant and not as to the other was a dit-
f erence in evidence. The record, however, shows 
almost an identity of evidence which could have been 
presented at the trials of the two defendants. The 
following discussion of facts and testimony clearly 
shows that both defendants were present at the scene 
of the crime, that both defendants took an active 
part in the perpetration of the crime, that both 
defendants were arrested within a minute or two of :-
each other, that both were apprehended within a few 
feet of the window which was broken to gain entry, 
that both defendants made admissions and incriminating 
statements to the police and that both defendants 
were charged with the same crime. 
The witness, Mrs. Hardy, heard and saw two men 
talking directly below the window which was later 
broken, and she saw two men ducking to avoid car 
lights (R. J2-JJ, )8, 41, 79). The broken window 
was apparently so high that boosting from the outside 
I 
l 
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or pulling from within would be necessary to enter 
(R. 79, 40, 84). Whether one or both of the co-
defendants entered the building is, of course, 
irrelevant, but some testimony does indicate that 
two aen may have been inside. The witness, Mrs. 
Hardy, saw one man jump from the window either be-
fore the police came or just after the police cars 
arrived (R. 34), and another man apparently jumped 
after the police cars had arrived and the policemen 
had walked around, had conferred with each other and 
had separated (R. 40, 34, 46-47). Defendant Houle 
was first seen by the police ten feet from the 
building walking away from the area of the broken 
window and appearing very nervous (R. 60). He was 
immediately apprehended (R. 60). Mr. Garcia was 
caught a few feet from the building, running from 
the area of the broken window (Ro 47). Mr. Houle 
admitted knowledge of the burglary by indicating, 
among other things, that someone else was still in 
the building (R. 61, 62). Mr. Garcia admitted to 
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having "screwed up" and to having scraped his shin 
on the window (R. 67, 68). 
The only difference in evidence would be that 
Mr. Garcia aay have scraped his shin and cut his 
trousers going through the window (R, 69, 67), but 
such testimony would only establish the fact that 
at least one of the two individuals had entered 
the building--a fact necessary for the ecnviction 
of either of them. 
Not only does the trial record reveal no dif-
f erence in the evidence which might differentiate 
between the defendants, but the prosecuting attorne1 
could find none. The prosecuting attorney was 
specifically requested by the lower Court to enlighten 
it as to any possible justifications for such dis-
parate treatment, and the county attorney indicated 
he would have sufficient time to prepare far the 
hearing (R. 88}. And yet, after utilizing that 
sufficient ti.me and after conferring with people in 
I his office (R, 89), he came up with nothing. He 
! 
;, 
I 
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could not enlighten the Court as to any related 
rational distinctions in evidence to justify one 
defendant's being allowed to plead guilty to re-
duced charges. 
Also, Appellant misleadingly asserts that dif • 
ferent evidence was presented at the preliminary 
hearing against the defendants {App. Br. at 3). 
However, no preliminary hearings were held as has 
been explained in the FACTS, supra. 
Appellant's second justification for discrilllina-
tory treatment against Respondent Garcia is a dit-
f erence in the previous criminal records between 
the two defendants {App. Br. at J). This, too, is 
misleading and incorrect. No evidence whatsoever 
appears in the trial record as to the past criminal 
record of the co-d.ef endant, Houle, and very little 
appears as to that of the Respondent. Respondent 
Carcia admitted pleading guilty to a misdemeanor 
for which he served out a probationary period with-
out event (R. 94). The trial record seems to 
19 
indicate at one point that Respondent was convicted 
of a previous felony (R. 82), but the record later 
shows that that is incorrect (R. 94). EYen though 
Respondent had pleaded guilty to a previous mis-
demeanor, no evidence was 'Presented at the hearing 
on the motion to reduce charges to show that de-
fendant Houle's record was any less than that of 
Bespondent. Again, it must be pointed out that 
the county attorney hiJlself indicated he had suff 1-
cient time to prepare for the hearing and to point 
out to the Court at least one justification for un-
equal treatment, yet nothing was produced to show 
the previous criminal record of either defendant. 
Respondent challenges the record and challenges 
Appellant to show from the record any difference 
whatsoever in prior criminal records between Respondent 
and his co-defendant. 
Even if the prosecution had shown the lower 
Court that a difference in prior criminal records 
existed between the two defendants, such a showing 
20 
would not justify unequal treatment before trial. 
Prior records do not determine guilt or innocence 
or chances for conviction or involvment in a crime 
or any other factor which a prosecutor might con-
sider in reducing charges. Prior records are a 
tool of judges to properly determine a just sentence, 
a sentence to fit an individual who has already been 
found guilty. 
Not only is there no evidentiary difference 
or any difference in the prior records between the 
two defendants, but no other justifying reason was 
given why one defendant should be allowed to serve 
ten days and the other be tried for a felony carrying 
a sentence of from one to twenty years in the state 
prison. The county attorney himself indicated that 
off-hand, he felt that the two individuals should 
have been treated equally (R. 87), and in trying 
to understand the discriminatory treatment, even in-
quir1d if the other defendant had testified on be-
half of the State, which he had not (R. 87). 
21 
The lower Court did not err. On the contrar7, 
it gave the prosecution eYery opportunity to justify 
its d1scria1natory treatment, but was coapelled to 
arrest jlJd8ment and discharge the defendant because 
the prosecution produced absolutely nothing to 
justify its actions. 
POINT III. 
SUBJECTING ONE OF TWO CO-DEFENDANTS TO THB 
POSSIBILITY OF FAR GREATER PUNISHMENT FOR 
DOING THE SAME ACT UNDER THE SAME CIRCUM-
STANCES IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
THE LAW UNLESS SOME JUSTIFYING REASON APPEARS. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington 
considered a similar issue in State v. Zornes, 4?5 
P.2d 109 (Wash. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Zornes). 
In that case, a statute effectively gave the prose-
cution the authority to charge one of two individuals 
doing the same act under the same circUDlstances with 
a felony and the other with a misdemeanor. The statute 
laid down no basis or standard to distinguish between 
the felony and the aisdemeanor caseso The Washington 
Court reversed the lower Court's conviction and dis-
llissed the aatter, paraphrasing a previous Washington · 
case as controllinga 
22 
"An act (legislative) which prescribes 
different punishJlents for the same act 
and thereby purports to authorize a 
prosecutor to charge one person with a 
felony and a.~other with a misdemeanor 
for the same act col!l1llitted under the 
same circumstances, denies the equal 
protection of the law guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution ••• Id. at 117. (Emphasis 
added) -
Although Zornes concerns a state statute, the 
principle applies equally well if not more to prose-
cutors not acting under color of a statute. In 
Zornes, the statute allowed the prosecution to subject 
one of two similarly situated defendants to the 
possibility of greater punishment, but presented 
the prosecution no reasonable or justifiable standard 
to aid in determining who should or should not be · 
subjected to the possibility of the greater punish-
ment. In the present case, the prosecution, without 
the benefit of a statute, subjects one of the two 
defendants to the possibility of imllensely greater 
punishment and treats one lightly "for the same act 
com.m1tted under the same circumstances" without any 
reasonable or justifiable basis whatsoever. And the 
23 
co-defendants in the present case were not merel7 
similarly but identically situated. 
Certainly, a prosecutor must not be allowed to 
do by indirection what is forbidden an entire state 
legislature to do directly. The result is the saae 
whether reached by a prosecutor or by a legislature, 
and that result is a denial of equal protection of the 
law guaranteed by the United States Constitution and 
similarly the constitution of the State of Utah. 
In Zornes, the Court carefully distinguished 
situations where discretion, based upon soae relevant 
and justifiable basis, results in the possibility of 
greater punishment. For exalllple, a jllige's discretion 
in sentencing was correctly d1stinguished1 a judge 
must certainly weigh and consider and base every sent-
ence upon many relevant factors. Also, a law which 
made one of two similar offenses a felony and the other 
a misdemeanor (use and possession of drugs) was dis• 
tinguished as not being a denial of equal protection 
' because "the elements of the two crimes differed and 
there was a legislative standard for the prosecution to · 
l 
decide which off ender should be charged under which 
24 
statute." Id. at 118. 
But where, as in the present case, the prose-
eution 's discretion has been unbridled, and where 
no logical consideration or reason whatsoever is 
presented to an inquiring Court to justify a dif-
ference in treatment of the two identically situated 
individuals, subjecting one of the two individuals 
to the possibility of far greater punishment than 
the other is a denial of equal protection of the 
laws. 
In In Re King, 474 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1970), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court struck down a state criminal 
statute which would have achieved the same result aa 
was attempted to be achieved against Respondent in 
the present case. The statute provided that resi-
dent, non-supporting fathers were chargeable with a 
misdemeanor while out-of-state non-supporting fathers 
were chargeable with a felony. The Court recognized 
that to expose one of two individuals to the possi-
b111 ty of a more seveiepunishment, some differentiating 
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rational basis, related to the crime, is mandatory. 
The Court paraphrased the petitioner's argument and 
concurred therewith1 
• • 
"He (Petitioner) argues that in punishing a 
father who 'remains out of the state• aore 
severely than the father remaining within 
the state, the provision establishes a 
classification not sufficiently related to 
any legitimate governmental purpose and 
effectively undertakes an impermissible 
invidious discrimination against non-
Calif ornia residents." Id. at 987. 
The Co\lI't concludes that "the felony provision 
• must succumb to the Constitutional attack 
mounted by petitioner," Id. at 987. 
The Court further coJJ1J11ented on the need for a 
related basis for discriminatory treatments 
.. The nature of the crime of non-support does 
not vary with the place of its coJlllllission." 
~· at 988. 
In other words, imposing more severe charges and 
greater punishment merely because of an unrelated factor 
suck as locality of the offense is unconstitutional. 
Similarly, imposing greater charges on Respondent 
is unconstitutional, for no factor which changed the 
"nature of the crime" nor was even remotely related 
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to the crime was presented to the lover Court 1a 
justification of the discriminatory action on the 
part of the prosecution. 
Here, it must be reiterated that a prosecutor 
must not be allowed to do by indirection what is for-
bidden an entire state legislature to do directly. 
Not only does logic dictate that the principle 
enunciated in Zornes and In Re Kif16 applies equally 
well to prosecutors as it does to legislatures, but 
the United States Supreme Court has indicated that 
same position. In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 
7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Oyler)~ 
Appellant was convicted under the West Virginia 
habitual criminal statute and filed a Habeas Corpus 
application in the Supreme Court of West Virginia 
alleging, among other grounds, a denial of equal pro-
tection because the habitual criminal statute had 
been applied only to a minority of those persons sub-
ject to its provisions. The Court was unanimous in 
finding no denial of equal protection as a result of 
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the alleged discriminatory application of the statute, 
because a rational basis appeared for the seemingl7 
discriminatory treataent1 
"Hence, the allegations set out no more 
than a failure to prosecute others because 
of a lack of knowle e of their ior 
offenses." Id. at 45 • Emphasis added) 
In the present ease, however, the county attorney's 
office did not fail to prosecute Respondent's co-
conspirator on the felony charge as a result of lack 
of knowledge, lack of evidence or lack or presence of any 
other factor which related to the crime. The evi-
dence was identical as to both defendants. 
In Oyler, the Court further explained its finding 
that there was no denial of equal protection because 
some rational basis for seeaing discrillination 
appeared a 
"It was not stated that the selection of 
those to be prosecuted was deliberately 
based upon an unjustifiable standard such 
as race rel' ion or other arbitrar 
classification." Id. at 45 • Emphasis 
added) ~ 
In the present case, however, judgment was arrested 
precisely for the reason that the selection of the 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
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person to be prosecuted for the felon7 was stated 
by Respondent's counsel to be based on nothing but 
an unjustifiable arbitrary standard or classifica-
tion. Respondent's attorney brought the discrimina-
tion to the attention of the Court (R. 86-87), and 
as has been previously stated, the prosecution failed 
to produce even an iota of evidence upon which to 
base a justifiable reason or standard for its actions. 
Appellant again misleads this Court by quoting 
Miss Rita James, Court appointed amicus curiae, as 
distinguishing Oyler from the present case (App. · 
Br. at 9). Appellant takes her statements out of 
context. In reality, she cited Oyler for the pro-
position that there had been a denial of equal pro-
tection in the present case, if no justifying reason 
for differing treatment existed. She clearly stated1 
"But to read Oyler without getting that 
meaning out of it wouldn't make any sense 
really." (R. 92) 
After independent research by Miss James to aid 
the lower Court in determining the law on reducing 
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charges against one of two similarly situated de-
fendants, she concluded1 
"If the Court finds as a matter of fact that 
the defendant was a victim of some arbitrary 
discrimination, 1.e., that the decision to 
allow his co-defendant to plead guilty to a 
misdemeanor was not based on some matter 
relating to the evidence or other area in 
the nrosecutor's discretion, that we have 
an uneJual apnlication of the laws." 
(R. 91 (Emphasis added}. 
Not only have the Courts reccgnized that in the 
interests of justice and fairness silllilarly situated 
defendants must be treated similarly, but the .American 
Bar Association (hereinafter referred to as the ABA) 
has so recognized. The ABA minimWR standards relating 
to pleas of guilty, which all prosecutors in good 
conscience should follow, clearly statess 
"Similarly situated defendants should be 
afforded equal plea agreement oppor-
tunities." ABA, Standards Relating to 
Pleas of Guilty{ J.l(c) at page 11 (1968) 
(Emphasis added} 
This standard is one of many adopted by the 
House of Delegates of the ABA on February 19, 1968, 
after years of study, evaluation and consideration. 
Appellant cites NeWJnan v. United States~ )82 
F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (hereinafter cited as 
Nenan) as the leading case for the proposition that 
different treatment of identically situated de-
fendants is not a denial of equal protection of the 
laws. However, Newman is based on a proposition 
which is entirely inapplicable to the present ease, 
i.e., that Courts cannot review the acts of prose-
cutors1 
"The Courts have no power over the exer-
cise of his (a prosecutor's) discretion 
or his motives as they relate to the 
execution of his duty." Id. at 481. 
(Emphasis added) -
In Newman, the Court found no denial of equal 
protection, because the Court failed to look at the 
merits of the acts of the prosecutors. The Court 
assumed that it could not inquire into those acts. 
Later, the Court reiterated. its statement1 
"No Court has any jurisdiction to inquire 
into or review his (a prosecutor's) 
decision ... Id. at 482. 
The Court's position is that a prosecutor is 
responsible to the judiciary onl~ "for the manner of 
his conduct of a case, i.e., his demeanor, deportment 
L and ethical conduct,,_"_-____;,I,;;d~·_:a'.:_t:_48.:..::.:l~·'...-----------
Jl 
In Newman, the Court felt that assistant United 
States attorneys should be responsible to higher-ups 
in the justice department and not to the Courts. 
But the principle announced in Newman is 
totally inapplicable in the present case. The most 
basic principles of judicial review and administra-
tive law allow Courts to consider executive decisions. 
Certainly, a prosecutor's discretion does not extend 
to arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or un-
constitutional acts: and surely the Courts can review 
alleged constitutional violations resulting from · 
abuse of discretion. 
In Oyler, supra, the Supreme Court of the United 
States reviewed the acts of the prosecution and 
apparently did so because it is not only the right .. 
but the duty of the Courts to review administrative 
acts which aay have resulted in constitutional vio-
lations. 
The idea that a :prosecutor should be responsible 
to higher-ups also does not apply in the present 
case. The county attorney has no higher-ups to 
account to. And even if there were higher-ups, it 
is the duty of the Courts to advise and settle the 
law so that the superiors can attempt to bring their 
people in line therewith. 
United States v. Taylor, 448 F.2d 1280 (4th 
Cir. 1971) as cited by Appellant was decided on the 
same inapplicable principle.· 
Appellant also cites State v. Andrews, 165 
N,W,2d 528 (Minn. 1969) (hereinafter cited as 
Andrews) as controlling. However, 1n that case 
the record contained nothing about the prosecution's 
considerations or lack of considerations in treating 
defendants differentlys 
"The record is obscure if not silent as 
to what considerations impelled the 
prosecution to grant lieniency to 
Schwarting (one of the defendants).M 
M_. at 5JO. 
In the present case, however, the record is not 
obscure as to the considerations of the prosecutor. 
The prosecution was specifically requested to tell the 
:n 
lower Court what considerations were inTolved 
(R. 88) and none could be presented. The present 
case is not an attempt to discover why the prosecu-
tion did what id did after the record is closed as 
in Andrews, but it is a case in which the prose-
cutor's lack of considerations is a matter of record. 
The record is neither silent nor obscure. 
Also, in Andrews, the Court based its decision 
on an assumption that does not -apply in the present 
cases 
"We can only assume that the prosecutor 
may have been willing to reduce the charge 
against Appellant if he in turn was willing 
to plead guilty." Id. at 5Jl. 
In the present case, however, the defendant was 
indeed willing to plead to a lessor offense, and even 
requested the opportunity so to plead (R. 86-8?). 
Ref erring again to Miss James, counsel for 
Appellant make a very unfair and misleading state-
ment on page 8 of their brief concerning her advice 
to the lower Court. A reading of the record will 
disclose that her statement on page 8 of Appellant's 
brief is cleverly and unfairly paraphrased and taken 
out of context by Counsel for Appellant. Although 
Appellant cites her as making a positive assertion, 
her real statement is in the nature of a passing 
thought in which she used the word "perhaps" three 
times, and which she even refuted as producing 
ridiculous results1 
"If we say that (that which Appellant para-
phrased) we are in a position of a wrong 
(to Respondent and others similarly situated) 
without a remedy, and this is an untenable 
position." (R. 93) (Emphasis added) 
To show how erroneous the misstated position 
is, which Miss James herself indicates as untenable; 
Respondent cites the law on the aatterr 
"That the mistake that occurred in these 
proceedings was one of law and as to the 
powers and duties of the magistrate, and 
that the result thereof will result in 
the -person charged going without sentence 
or punishment whatsoever, does not alter 
his rights or change his position.* * * " 
Belter v. State, 178 Wis. 57, 189 N.W. 
270 at 271 (1922). (Emphasis added) 
The case of State v. Gamelgard, l?? N.V.2d 
404 (Minn. 1970) is cited by Appellant but has nothing 
to do with prosecutorial discretion and denial of 
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equal protection. The only denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws alleged in that case is far 
unreasonable differences in sentencing. Id. at 4'J?. 
In State v. Verdugo, 79 N.M. 765, 449 P.2d 
781 (1969) cited by Appellant, nothing appears which 
might indicate that the evidence was identical against 
both conspirators or that one did not cooperate and 
testify on behalf of the State, or that no other 
justification for differing treatment appeared. The 
facts are so lean and sparse that no one could sa7 
that they approach the facts at bar. 
Other cases cited by Appellant are also not 
applicable to the case at bar. The cases of 
People v. Winters, 342 P.2d 538 (cal. App. 1959)r 
Sanders v. Waters, 199 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1952)s 
State v. Reichenberger, 182 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1970)r 
State v. Hicks, 325 P.2d 794 (Ore. 1958)1 State v. 
Anderson, 159 NW.2d 892 (Minn. 1968) all stand for 
the proposition that a defendant is not denied equal 
protection of the laws merely because other people 
somewhere have not been prosecuted for the saae 
offense. These cases do not concern unequal treat-
ment of co-defendants charged with coaaitting an· 
identical crime. Appellant might better have cited 
State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 
(1965). In that case the prosecution stipulated that 
the action against the defendant was the only prose-
cution under the statute within two years. This 
Court held that such a stipulation did not indicate 
that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to bring 
cases against those who might be similarly situated1 
"We think the stipulation could by no means 
bind this Court by negative inuendo that 
because no one else was prosecuted, the 
defendant was persecuted." Id. at 177. 
But even State v. Starlight Club, is not in point 
here. In the present case, the evidence was suffi-
cient to arrest and charge both defendants and they 
were so charged. Also, the nature of that evidence 
did not change nor did new evidence appear after the 
arrest which might show that one of the two defendants 
was innocent or could not be convicted. The present 
--
case is not a matter of selectivel1 prosecuting those 
individuals against whom evidence has been or can 
be obtaineda but it is a case of discriminatorilf 
prosecuting where the evidence is identical. 
It must also be ma.de clear that Respondent la 
not attacking the plea bargaining process. Reductions 
in charges are often necessary and advisable in our 
judicial system as it now operates, but reductions 
should and must be based upon SOile logical con-
siderations which are related to the offense. 
Defendants who are similarly situated must be 
similarly treated with respect to prosecution or 
our American system has failed miserably to mete out 
justice and gain the respect of all races and peoples. 
The lower Court would have greatly erred had it al.lowed 
Respondent to be prosecuted for the felony. Assuaing 
arguendo that Respondent had been convicted and he 
had been sent to the state prison and a felony con-
viction had been placed on his record, and keeping in 
mind that his co-defendant served ten days in a 
county jail and that no differences existed between 
the two defendants, what could anyone in this world 
say to the parents and the relatives and the friends 
of Respondent which could in any way convince the• 
that justice applies to all equally and that Chicanos 
are on equal terms with all races before the law? 
The most unsophisticated sense of injustice would 
awaken and be repelled at such a difference in treat-
ment between two individuals. The lower Court acted 
to assure all peoples equal protection before the law 
and did not err. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal is moot and should be dismissed. 
No judgment exists which this Honorable Court can 
reinstate, and any other action which aight affect 
Respondent would be useless and futile, because 
Respondent has been in jeopardy and was discharged 
before judgment. 
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If an advisory opinion is written, the lower 
Court should be &ffirlled. The lover Court gave 
the prosecution every possible chance to justif1 
its actions, and to show some reasonable basis for 
the discriminatory treatment. Because the prose-
cution produced nothing in justification, the lower 
Court was compelled to arrest judgment. The lower 
Court did not err. 
Respectfully subaitted, 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
Attorney for Respondent 
